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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court lacks the jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the judgment
appealed was not final as required by Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (See
Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition filed August 1, 2007; denied without
prejudice August 28, 2007.)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
Although the Appellee contests and disputes the Appellant's positions with regard
to the issues presented for appeal, Appellee is satisfied with the statement of the three
issues of the case referenced in the Appellant's Brief and therefore, pursuant to Rule 24
(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a statement of issues is not included.

STATEMENT OF DETERMANITIVE LAWS
Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides in pertinent part:
Filing Appeal from Final Orders and Judgments: An appeal may be taken from
a district court or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal
from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a
notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4...
Rule 24(b)(1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
A statement of the issues of the case [shall not be included in the Appellee Brief]
unless the Appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the Appellant.
§ 10-9a-801(3), Utah Code Provides:
(a) The Courts shall:
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the
authority of this chapter is valid; and
1

(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(b) A decision, ordinance or regulation involving the exercise of legislative
discretion is valid if the decision, ordinance, or regulation is reasonable debatable and not
illegal.
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious
or illegal
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision,
ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the
decision was made or the ordinance or regulation was adopted.
§ 10-3-506, Utah Code Provides:
A roll call vote shall be taken and recorded for all ordinances, resolutions, and any
action which would create a liability against the municipality and in any other case at the
request of any member of the governing body by a "yes" or a "no" vote and shall be
recorded. Every resolution or ordinance shall be in writing before the vote is taken.
§ 10-3-508, Utah Code Provides:
Any action taken by the governing body shall not be reconsidered or rescinded at
any special meeting unless the number of members of the governing body present at the
special meeting is equal to or greater than the number of members present at the meeting
when the action was approved.
§ 2.08.030, Smithfield Municipal Code ("SMC") provided at all relevant times:
Except as otherwise specifically required or provided by law, this chapter, or by
resolution of the governing body, the most current edition of "Robert's Rules of Order"
shall govern the procedure and conduct of the meetings of the governing body.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 27, 2007, the trial court entered its Declaratory Judgment on this matter.
This judgment was not a final adjudication of the action. The issue of the amount of

2

attorney fees was still pending. Appellant prematurely filed an appeal with this court on
March 28, 2007; therefore the appeal must fail for lack of jurisdiction. Matters involving
an award of attorney fees are not appealable until the amount of attorney fees to be
awarded has judicially been determined and ordered. The trial court entered an order and
judgment for attorney fees on April 4, 2007.
Appellant originally brought this action (pursuant to Section 10-9a-801, Utah
Code), before the First District Court of Cache County for review of the adoption of a rezone ordinance by Appellee, Smithfield City. The dispute on appeal centers on the
legality of the City's adoption of the rezoning ordinance on February 8, 2006. Appellant
argues that the ordinance is procedurally illegal because the City did not strictly follow
Robert's Rules of Order, which the City had previously adopted as governing the
procedure and conduct of the meetings of the City.
Appellee, Smithfield City, asserts that Robert's Rules of Order is irrelevant to this
appeal because there was no "reconsideration" involved in the adoption of City
Ordinance No. 06-01. Robert's Rules of Order is the designated procedure of City
meetings as a matter of convenience, but are not strictly followed both because of the
complexity of the Rules and because it is not always convenient or realistic to do so.
Nevertheless, to the extent that Robert's Rules of Order apply, the City argues that
Appellant was not prejudiced by the City's failure to strictly comply with the Robert's
Rules of Order, and the re-zone ordinance, City Ordinance 06-07, was properly and
legally adopted.
The parties each filed motions for summary judgment and the City sought a
3

declaratory judgment. On March 27, 2007, the trial court entered the subject Declaratory
Judgment, which Appellant seeks to appeal. The trial court upheld the legality and
validity of the re-zone Ordinance, denied Appellant/ Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment, and granted the City's motion for summary judgment and declaratory
judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee submits the following as the material and relevant facts regarding this
appeal:
1.

Prior to January 25, 2006, an application to re-zone approximately 24.5

acres of land in Smithfield City was duly filed. (City Minutes January 25, 2006.)
2.

A City Council meeting was held January 25, 2006. During the January 25,

2006 City Council meeting, a previously-noticed public hearing was held to address the
proposed rezone application and the proposed ordinance (Ordinance No. 06-01 and City
Minutes, January 25, 2006.)
3.

At the conclusion of the public hearing and discussion by the City Council,

a motion was made to adopt the re-zone of the entire proposed parcel. However, that
motion was amended to reduce the proposed area to be rezoned by approximately onethird. (City Minutes January 25, 2006.)
4.

There was no written ordinance before the City Council as described by the

amended motion and which contained the legal description for the reduced area which
was proposed under the amended motion to be rezoned. (Affidavit Jim Gass, January 19,
2007; City Minutes January 25, 2006.)
4

5.

During the January 25, 2006 City Council meeting, no motion to

"reconsider" was made with respect to said rezone action, and the meeting adjourned
without such a motion being made. (City Minutes, January 25, 2006.)
6.

On the day after said meeting, January 26, 2006, the Smithfield City

Manager (Jim Gass) undertook to draft an ordinance which contained the legal
description for the reduced area that had been voted on the night before. (Affidavit Jim
Gass, January 19, 2007)
7.

During the first few days after said meeting, the City Manager was

contacted by at least two members of the City Council, at different times, both of whom
had questions about exactly where the northern boundary of the area to be rezoned was to
be located. There appeared to be different understandings of where the northern line was
to be located. (Affidavit Jim Gass, January 19, 2007)
8.

Given the apparent confusion related to what the description for the

proposed area for rezone should be, legal advice was sought from the City Attorney, the
Attorney for the Utah League of Cities and Towns and from the State Real Property
Ombudsman. All three advised the City Manager and City Recorder that an ordinance
had to be in writing and before members of the City Council before it could be properly
adopted (see section 10-3-506, U.C.A.). (Affidavit Jim Gass, January 19, 2007)
9.

In accordance with the legal advice received and in an attempt to have an

ordinance with a correct description before the City Council at its next regular meeting
(which meeting was held on February 8, 2006), four color-coded draft ordinances were
prepared, each with different boundary lines for the proposed rezone area. The color5

coded draft ordinances were presented to the City Council at the February 8, 2006,
meeting together with the original ordinance (Ordinance 06-01) which would have
rezoned the entire area. (Affidavit Jim Gass, January 19, 2007)
10.

At the meeting of February 8, 2006, the proposed rezone in question was on

the agenda, again discussed, with comments from the audience permitted, and a motion
was made, seconded and adopted to rezone the entire original 24.5-acre parcel
(Ordinance No. 06-01, City Minutes, February 8, 2006.)
11.

Subsequently, the Appellant challenged the adoption of Ordinance No. 06-

01. The City's Ordinances provide that Robert's Rules of Order shall govern the
procedure and conduct of the meetings of the City. Said Rules of Order require that a
"motion for reconsideration" be made and adopted during the same meeting that the item
to be reconsidered was first considered. (Robert's Rules pp. 306-313)
12.

There was no ordinance in writing which reflected the amended motion at

the January 25, 2006 meeting. (Affidavit of Jim Gass, January 19, 2007)
13.

The Appellant presented no evidence to the trial court that he was

prejudiced by the City's failure to comply with this "reconsideration" requirement of
Robert's Rules of Order. (Court Record; Transcript of hearing February 21, 2007, pages
57-64 and 72-88.)
14.

On March 10, 2006, Appellant/ Petitioner petitioned the trial court to

review the adoption of City Ordinance No. 06-01. Subsequently motions and counter
motions for relief were filed. (Court record.)
15.

On December 15, 2006, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision
6

which, among other things, awarded Defendant\Appellee all of its attorney fees and costs.
(Memorandum Decision December 15, 2006,)
16.

On or about March 27, 2007, the trial court entered its Declaratory

Judgment. (Declaratory Judgment, March 27, 2007.)
17.

On or about March 28, 2007, Appellant/ Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal

appealing the Declaratory Judgment entered on March 27, 2007. (Notice of Appeal,
March 28, 2007.)
18.

On or about April 4, 2007, the trial court entered its Order for Payment of

Attorney's Fees and Costs to Appellee/Defendant. (Order, April 4, 2007.)
19.

Appellee filed its motion for summary disposition on August 1, 2007, and

argued that the appeal was untimely and thus the court lacked jurisdiction. (Motion for
Summary Disposition, July 31, 2007)
20.

This court issued an order on August 28, 2007, which denied without

prejudice the motion for summary disposition. (Order, August 28, 2007.)

SUMMARY OF THE APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT
This court does not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the Notice of
Appeal was untimely. The well-accepted law in Utah is that a judgment is not final if
there is an unadjudicated issue of attorney fees. Appellee was awarded its fees and costs
at the trial level, but before the amount of those fees was adjudicated, the Notice of
Appeal was filed. No subsequent Notice or Appeal was filed. Thus the appeal is defective
and consequently this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this matter.
7

City Ordinance 06-07 was adopted on Februrary 8, 2006.

Such was not a

"reconsideration." Nevertheless, Appellee, Smithfield City had the right and power to
reconsider in a subsequent official meeting a decision made in a previous meeting to
adopt a re-zone ordinance where the ordinance first proposed for adoption was not in
writing and before the City Council. The City's adoption of Robert's Rules of Order as
the procedural governance of municipal meetings has no bearing on the enactment of
Smithfield City Ordinance 06-01, because Ordinance 06-01 was not adopted by
reconsideration per se of a previously adopted ordinance. Rather, Ordinance 06-01 was
first adopted on February 8, 2006, after further consideration of a proposed amendment to
Ordinance 06-01, made during the City Council Meeting on January 25, 2006, which was
not in writing. By law every municipal ordinance shall be in writing before a valid vote
can be taken to adopt the ordinance. (See Section 10-3-506, Utah Code.)

Neither

Ordinance 06-01, nor any amended version of it, was adopted on January 25, 2006; thus,
no reconsideration of an adopted Ordinance (Ordinance 06-01 or any amendment to
Ordinance 06-01) occurred or could have occurred on February 8, 2006.
Even if Robert's Rules of Order were relevant to the consideration of this appeal,
Appellant was not prejudiced by the City's failure to strictly follow said Rules. Absent
demonstrated evidence of actual prejudice to the Appellant, he may not complain that
Smithfield City "reconsidered" the adoption of Ordinance 06-01 in violation of Robert's
Rules of Order. The Appellant is not entitled to claim that an ordinance was adopted on
January 25, 2006, when the ordinance was not in writing and did not exist at the time of
the City meeting. The Appellant was, however, given notice of the next regularly
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scheduled City meeting of February 8, 2006. The previously published agenda of the
February meeting identified the subject of consideration of Ordinance 06-01. The public
was allowed to comment on the agenda item. Draft ordinances intended to conform to the
relevant motion made on January 25, 2006 were in writing and available

for

consideration together with the original Ordinance 06-01. And after due discussion and
consideration the original Ordinance 06-01 was adopted. Appellant has failed to
demonstrate prejudice.
Smithfield City Ordinance 06-01 is legal and valid. The judgment of the trial court
should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT HAS NOT APPEALED FROM A FINAL ORDER AND

THUS THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "in the interest of judicial economy, a trial
court must determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to a party before the
judgment becomes final for the purposes of an appeal." ProMax Development
Raile, 998 P.2d 254, 258 (Utah 2000).

Corp. v.

The Utah Supreme Court's reasoning for

following such a rule is based on judicial efficiency and is explained as follows:
"It will save the resources of the parties and this court if the issue of attorney fees can be
determined in the same appeal in which the merits of the underlying judgment are
examined. Otherwise, a second appeal must be taken to challenge the amount of attorney
fees awarded subsequent to the judgment on the merits and then examined in light of the
judgment on the merits." Id.
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In Sittner v. Schriever, the trial court granted summary judgment in respondents'
favor on March 25, but waited until June 27 to sign a supplemental judgment concerning
a stipulated fee award. Sittner v. Schriever, 2 P.3d 442, 443 (Utah 2000). The Utah
Supreme Court determined the 30 day period to file an appeal began not after the March
25 judgment, as the court of appeals ruled, but after the June 27 judgment when the
attorney fees were fixed. Id. Only after the attorney fees were fixed was the judgment
final and ready for appeal. Id. at 446.
In a case very similar to the one at issue, the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed an
appeal due to lack of jurisdiction because the attorney fees had not been resolved at the
trial court level. Turville v. J&JProps, L.C., 2004 UT App 389 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). In
Turville, it was determined that the Notice of Appeal filed by Appellant was premature
because the trial court judgment, upon which the Appellant based his appeal, did not
resolve the issue of attorney fees and, thus, was not final or appealable. Id. Appellee's
motion for summary dismissal on the basis of lack of jurisdiction was granted and the
court of appeals dismissed the appeal. Id. Additionally, attorney fees were awarded to
Appellee to the extent they were incurred in filing the motion for summary disposition.
Id.
Declaratory Judgment was entered in the present action on March 27, 2007. This
judgment did not address the pending issue of attorney fees and costs. The Order for
Payment of Attorney's Fees and Costs to Defendant was entered on April 4, 2007.
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on the Declaratory Judgment on March 28, 2007. The
Notice of Appeal was premature. No amended notice of appeal has been filed. No timely
10

notice of appeal has been filed. No motions as described under Rule 4(b) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure have been filed.
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows appellate jurisdiction from
all "final orders and judgments" of the district court. Where an appeal is taken as a matter
of right from the final decision of the trial court, the notice of appeal must be filed with
the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment or order.
(See Rule 4(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Emphasis added.).
The most recent pronouncement on this issue is the Utah Supreme Court decision
in Beddoes v Giffm, 158 P.3d 1102. Speaking of the jurisdictional requirement of Rule
3(a) the Supreme Court said:
This "final judgment rule" "prevents a party from prematurely appealing a nonfinal judgment and thereby preserves scarce judicial resources."
Then referencing the decision of ProMax Development Corp v. Raile the court
said:
As we explained in ProMax, disputes as to attorney fees must be resolved in order
to have final judgment for appeal, but disputes as to court costs need not.
As provided under the aforementioned rules and case law, matters involving an
award of attorney fees are not appealable until the amount of attorney fees to be awarded
has judicially been determined and ordered. Because the Declaratory Judgment of March
27, 2007 is not a final adjudication of all matters of the case, the Notice of Appeal was
untimely and the appeal must be dismissed.

11

II.

CITY ORDINANCE 06-01 IS VALID AND LEGAL
Utah Code Section 10-9a-801 governs the District Court's review of the adoption

of City Ordinance 06-01. Section 10-9a-801 (3) (a) through (d) is particularly relevant to
the question of the action taken by the Smithfield City Council at its regular meeting held
on Wednesday, February 8, 2006. (See City Minutes February 8, 2006.) A review of
subsection (3) reveals that uthe Court shall: presume that a decision, ordinance, or
regulation made under the authority of this Chapter is valid; and determine only whether
or not, the decision, ordinance or regulation is arbitrary, capricious or illegal." That
subsection goes on to say that "a[n]... ordinance... involving the exercise of legislative
discretion is valid if the... ordinance... is reasonably debatable and not illegal." It further
states that "a final decision of a land use authority... is valid if the decision is supported
by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious or illegal." Finally, it
states, "a determination of illegality requires a determination that the... ordinance...
violates a law, statute or ordinance in effect at the time [that] the decision was made or
the ordinance or regulation [which was] adopted."
As required by 10-9a-801(7) the land use authority, Smithfield City, transmitted to
the District Court the record of its proceedings, including its Minutes, Findings, Orders,
and, if available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings.
Section 10-9a-801 (8) provides that if there is a record...
"the District Court's review is limited to the record provided by the land use
authority,.... The Court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the
record of the land use authority unless the evidence was offered to the land use
authority or the appeal authority, respectively, and this Court determines that it
was improperly excluded. If there is no record, the Court may call witnesses and
12
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take evidence."
Utah Code Sections 10-3-506 and 10-3-508 are also instructive. As stated
previously, subsection 506 provides that before a vote is taken to adopt a municipal
ordinance the ordinance must be in writing. Because the amended motion which was
approved at the January 25, 2006 Council meeting was to adopt an ordinance which was
not in writing and thus not before the Council, it was not legal. And significantly, it
would of necessity have had to have been considered again when the ordinance was
written. That opportunity came on February 8, 2006. But at that meeting, instead of
voting on and adopting one of four proposed draft ordinances which were intended to
codify the amended motion made in the previous meeting, the Council elected to adopt
the original written ordinance 06-01. This was not a "reconsideration" in the sense of
changing an ordinance which had been previously and legally adopted, but rather was a
legitimate and authorized continuation of the legislative process of the governing body to
adopt, in the first instance, an ordinance. Nevertheless, Section 10-3-508, by implication,
allows reconsideration:
"Any action taken by the governing body shall not be reconsidered or rescinded at
a special meeting unless the number of members of the governing body present at the
special meeting is equal to or greater than the number of members present at the meeting
when the action was approved."
Now admittedly, the subject re-zone ordinance was not reconsidered at a special
meeting. It was adopted at a regular and duly noticed meeting for that purpose. But, state
law allows reconsideration of ordinances. The flaw in Appellant's argument is that no
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ordinance was adopted in the January 25, 2006, meeting. The subject ordinance was
adopted on February 8, 2006.
The case of Patterson v. Alpine City, 663 P.2d 95, 96 (Utah 1983) provides legal
support for this provision of the law. Referencing section 10-3-506, the Court stated,
"the language of the above statute requiring that all resolutions shall be in writing is
mandatory". The case dealt with the imposition of a sewer connection fee which was not
established by resolution or ordinance in writing. Thus, the District Court in that case did
not err in concluding that the sewer connection fee was not established as required by law
and therefore invalid. Section 10-3-506 of the Utah Code, in the last sentence thereof,
provided then as it does now, "Every resolution or ordinance shall be in writing before
the vote is taken".
With this requirement in mind, and the record which has been presented to the
Court, it is abundantly clear that the only written ordinance before the City Council at the
meeting on January 25, 2006, was an ordinance that provided for the rezone to residential
of the entire parcel that was proposed for rezoning. After a motion was made to adopt
said ordinance, Council member Monson requested an Amendment, which was accepted
and voted upon, but there was no written ordinance before the City Council which
contained the legal description for the area to be rezoned under the Amended Motion.
Several actions are suggested by the Petitioner that might have been done to provide a
written ordinance for the City Council to review, before the vote was taken. However,
the meeting was held at the City's Senior Citizen's Center, where access to a computer
and similar items was not available. The fact is that a written ordinance was not before
14

the members of the City Council before the vote was taken on the January 25, 2006
action. As stated above and in Patterson, having the ordinance in writing is mandatory.
In that case, the failure to have the resolution in writing caused it to be invalid. The
failure to have an ordinance in writing before the City Council before a vote was taken
means that the attempt to adopt an ordinance on January 25, 2006, was legally
insufficient and failed.
Therefore, the next appropriate step was to make sure that a written ordinance was
prepared and before the City Council in order for a vote to be taken. This occurred in a
properly noticed meeting on February 8, 2006. Once proper notice has been given and
necessary public hearings have been held by both the Planning Commission and the City
Council, neither State nor City law requires that an ordinance adopting the proposed
rezone be adopted within any set period of time after the last public hearing. It was legal
and proper to place this item on the agenda for the next Council meeting, have an
ordinance in writing for consideration by the City Council and then seek a vote. The
property considered for rezone at the February 8, 2006 meeting was exactly the same as
had been considered by the Planning Commission, by the City Council and by the public
at two public hearings. The minutes from both meetings and the public hearings clearly
indicate that all concerns that had been raised were properly considered and that the same
concerns were discussed as a part of considering the ordinances presented at the February
8, 2006 meeting.

In fact, the Petitioner was aware of the action to be taken at the

February 8, 2006 meeting and called to discuss this with at least the City Manager and
requested that the City Manager raise his concerns at said meeting, which the Manager

15

did. (Affidavit Jim Gass January 19, 2007.) The concerns of the public at the two public
hearings and of City officials at the Planning Commission meeting and two City Council
meetings were thoroughly raised and discussed.

Nothing more could be gained by

holding another public hearing and another public hearing was not required.

The

requirements of Section 10-9a-503 of the Utah Code had been met by holding the two
public hearings before a zoning amendment was adopted and the Planning Commission
had given its recommendation. The City Code regarding such an amendment Section
17.08.040 SMC, had been complied with.
The action taken at the February 8, 2006 meeting was not a boundary clarification
subject to review by the Board of Adjustment/Appeal Authority, nor was it a "formality
cure". It was a proper original action taken in compliance with the requirements of State
and Municipal law to rezone real property. It is interesting that the Petitioner is very
rigid in stating that Smithfieid City must comply with the Robert's Rules of Order, when
the Supreme Court has granted latitude in this regard. At the same time, the Petitioner is
fairly lax in what he would apparently require with respect to having an ordinance in
writing before a vote is taken, when the Supreme Court has been very definite in saying
there is no latitude to be granted on this issue.

III.

APPLELLANT HAS NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY THE CITY'S ACTION
The Appellant suggests that if the City can change its action whenever a majority

chooses, what will prevent regular abuse of the legislative process? Appellant, however,
ignores the reality of the City's action. No ordinance was legally adopted on January 25,
16

2006. Indeed, the only relevant ordinance adopted by the City was on February 8, 2006.
State law and City regulations clearly provide that an ordinance is adopted only after
required notice and then is in writing, passes by a majority vote, and is signed by the
authorized officers of the City. The only ordinance which passes these requirements is
City Ordinance No. 06-01 adopted February 8, 2006.
The burden of showing prejudice rests properly with the one making such a claim.
(See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City ofSpringville;

see also Gardner

v. Perry City, referenced in Appellant's Brief, citations omitted.) Moreover, Code Section
10-9a-801(8) (a) precludes taking of evidence if a record of the challenged proceedings is
provided, as was the case here. The trial court found that Appellant was not prejudiced by
the February 8, 2006 adoption of Ordinance 06-01.
CONCLUSION
Not only does City Ordinance 06-01 enjoy a presumption of validity, it was
adopted conclusively by legal and proper means. The requirements for review by the
District Court have been met. The validity of the ordinance was upheld. The Appellant
prematurely appealed and thus jurisdiction is non existent for this court to consider the
matter further.
Appellant respectfully requests this court to dismiss the appeal. Alternatively this
court is requested to affirm the ruling of the trial court.
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